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ABSTRACT The automotive industry includes many actors engaged in software that 
span small and large companies within old and new sectors. This paper focuses on the 
controlling position of car manufacturers in the automotive software ecosystem and 
suggests three strategies for participating software innovators – contesting, 
cooperating and circumventing. The strategies are exemplified with current cases: 
Tesla as contestation, Bosch cooperation with a car manufacturer in a data collection 
project as a basis for future services, and circumventing in a project based on the 
mobile Internet. 
 
As vehicles continue to evolve into ‘mobile computing platforms’1, the closed automotive software 
ecosystem – whose standards and rules of access has been dominated for decades by car 
manufacturers – is opening. If this opening up occurs, that means that independent automotive 
software developers have the potential to play a more important role in the software ecosystem, 
engaging directly with automakers and consumers. There is also the potential for open source 
operating systems and open innovation, especially in the car information and entertainment, or 
infotainment, layer. This possibility seems especially exciting because on-board software has 
expanded by a factor of 15 within less than a decade1, and new car-to-cloud services, such as 
telematics car insurance policies, are likely to become ubiquitous among millions of drivers2.  
The opening-up of the car software platforms and related ecosystem is not going to happen without 
some resistance. The strategic management literature advises the established major auto firms to 
preserve influence, control standards and sustain profitable 'strategic bottlenecks'3, 4, 5. This will be 
challenging as the auto industry is encountering four disruptions at once – automation, connectivity, 
electrification and sharing. As part of the debate on access to car software and data, our research 
questions are as follows: What are the strategies available for digital innovators in the emerging 
software ecosystem? What do these strategies mean for value creation and value capture? 
We present three cases that capture a current snapshot of the dynamics of the car software 
ecosystem – that is, the actors, how they work together and what this means for car digitalization. 
These cases represent examples of strategies advocated by experts: namely, the strategy of software 
actors cooperating with the bottleneck owners, the strategy of software actors circumventing the 
bottleneck, which may be possible through the wider digital ecosystems, and the strategy of software 
actors contesting the existing bottleneck. 
Two of the cases are current projects done by Bosch – that is not a car manufacturer, but a major 
supplier. The company is the world’s largest car-part-maker that employs 400,000 people worldwide. 
Bosch is very active in software and software innovation, spending nearly a tenth of its revenue on 
R&D with a strong emphasis on cloud data services. The first project exemplifies cooperation; it has 
collected about six million datasets from 2.2 million cars through a car manufacturer’s licensed 
workshops. The second project illustrates how the mobile internet infrastructure allows Bosch to 
circumvent car manufacturers, although in a constrained context. The final case is about Tesla 
Motors; we mention briefly the costs, risks and opportunities of contesting the industry's bottleneck 
by becoming a car manufacturer.   
Strategic Bottlenecks 
A strategic bottleneck is a place that obstructs a flow; for example, if all roads pass through a single 
bridge, then the bridge is a bottleneck. In the context of a software ecosystem, a strategic bottleneck 
is ‘a critical part of a technical system that has no – or very poor – alternatives at the present time’3.  
In the automobile industry, the major car manufacturers have historically controlled the industry’s 
architecture, for both hardware and software. That is, they have controlled who can do what (division 
of labor) and who gets what (division of revenue)4. 
Strategy scholars (such as Teece and Jacobides) suggest that software actors who are either inside, 
or wish to be a party in the ecosystem have a choice between three strategies:  
1. Cooperate with a strategic bottleneck owner. A low risk strategy that limits the innovators 
ability to profit from its work.  
2. Circumvent the strategic bottleneck. A risker strategy that raises the possibilities of profits.  
3. Contest the strategic bottleneck. Bottlenecks are unique or expensive to copy. Contestation 
has the greatest opportunity to create and capture value, but it requires large investment and 
may be risky.  
The automotive software ecosystem 
Cars are possibly the most complex artefact that consumers own.  The car is expensive, heavy, fast-
moving, operates in public spaces and is regulated for safety and environmental effect. A typical car 
contains about 30,000 mechanical, hydraulic, electrical and electronic parts, between 20 and 90 
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and millions of lines code. 
There are a dozen or so large car manufacturers (OEMs for Original Equipment Manufacturers). 
Over the last few decades, they have captured around three quarters of the industry’s value added, 
measured by total market capitalization5. This dominance is based on the manufacturers’ role as 
system integrators, their control of the customer experience, and their regulatory accountability. The 
industry’s slow clock speed also helps this domination5.  
Even though the car appears to be a very physical object, software controls car components such 
as fuel injection, steering systems and brakes since the 1980s.  In 2003, Autosar (Automotive Open 
System Architecture) and its related software ecosystem was established by a partnership 
manufacturers and suppliers. Autosar includes a standardized set of hardware-dependent ‘software 
components’ and a large set of hardware-independent application interfaces. This enables the 
development, integration and validation of applications independently and cater for multiple 
suppliers. There are many related standards and tools, for example, standards for diagnostics and 
calibration (ASAM), guidance for static analysis of C programming (C MISRA), and the Japanese 
car software standard (JasPar).  It is notable that Autosar requires that the final deployment of 
software into the car will be done by the car manufacturer, preventing deployment by third parties or 
consumers7, thus making the related software ecosystem closed.  
The current industry software ecosystem includes hundreds of companies that develop software 
for the vehicles’ Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Many are traditional hardware suppliers, like 
Bosch, that are also engaged in software and the related physical-subsystems. There are also many 
that sell only software that is not embedded in hardware. In addition, there are several open source 
automotive software projects and related communities such as COMASSO and BUSMASTER; these 
are active and popular projects, but not yet major players in the industry. 
Currently, the automotive industry is encountering four disruptions – automation, connectivity, 
electrification and sharing – that are all related to software. In response, OEMs try to shape the future 
ecosystem8. Standard-setting consortia are currently enlarging their scope to include communication, 
telematics, user-interface modelling, etc. Several operating systems of the vehicle’s communication 
control have emerged, including Automotive Grade Linux and Android Car. Commercial initiatives 
include HERE, a mapping company which is majority-owned by BMW, Audi and Daimler. OEMs 
offer connected car applications, such as Volvo’s Sensus, Volkswagen’s Car-Net; they provide maps 
and hand-free connection to the digital world. Ford has already integrated Amazon’s Alexa into one 
of its models, Android Auto and Apple CarPlay reports on hundreds of compatible car models.    
One result of these developments is new car digital services that are already offered. For example, 
insurance products that monitor driving behaviour and reduce premiums for careful drivers have been 
taken-up by almost one million customers in the UK2, and Tesla famously extended remotely the 
range of some of its electric cars during Hurricane Irma. Detailing these services and initiatives is 
beyond our goals. However, a possible future industry architecture may be seen through a recent 
position paper published by the European Automobile Manufacturers Association. Given 
considerations of safety and privacy, the association’s policy is that OEMs have the responsibility for 
transferring data from vehicles and that third parties will be access data only via the OEMs. 
Our research questions are what are the strategies available for digital innovators in this emerging 
software ecosystem? What do these strategies mean for value creation and value capture? 
Three strategies and cases 
To illustrate the three strategies we present three mini-cases.  
The first shows how Bosch is cooperating with a car manufacturer in order to collect data from 
millions of cars, as they are used by customers. Currently, the cooperation is achieved at a technical 
level and its current value lies in Bosch obtaining new shared knowledge that can be used to improve 
current components and systems. Bosch believes that these benefits have been considerable. In the 
near future, we expect similar technology to materialize as predictive maintenance services. For 
example, a driver will be able to buy a service that will monitor the car subsystems while driving and 
suggest crucial maintenance prior to a long trip. Another example may be temperature controlled 
trucks, their operators would buy a predictive maintenance subscription to prevent mishaps while 
carrying expensive cargo.  
The project concerns an Electronic Stability Control (ESC) system that controls the braking 
system; a system that includes sensors, actuators, pumps, ECU and related software9. Bosch obtained 
the right to collect and analyse the data, and in return, Bosch is conducting annual workshops to 
inform the manufacturer's engineers.  The data collection module was developed as part of the ESC 
software. The sensor and actuator drivers were written in C, while data and control flow were 
modelled with the ASCET code-generator, which is popular for embedded software. The full ESC 
software project employed four engineers, and followed a documented waterfall methodology (V-
Model) and Automotive SPICE process assessment.  
Data collection was planned carefully: the project defined a-priori what data to measure in order 
to answer specific engineering issues. Such data included minimal or maximal values, averages, 
histograms or other multi-dimensional structures. The resulting dataset was only 1.7k bytes, and the 
software updated it frequently during the vehicle operation. The data was collected at the 
manufacturer’s licensed workshops/garages using On Board Diagnostics protocol, transferred to the 
manufacturer and then to Bosch. To-date, 6 million data sets have been collected from 2.2 million 
cars, worldwide. These datasets created new understanding of the actual operation of the braking 
system along its life. 
Although Bosch believes that this project has had value, Bosch is limited in the kind of data it can 
access and the ways it can exploit it. Other companies, considering this strategy, may be similarly 
constrained, but they may also feel that additional value will be created when offering new services 
based on data, for example predictive maintenance. In other words, the current project is anchored in 
a manufacturer-supplier dyad, but future projects should create a more open ecosystem where other 
players will provide new services based on similar data collection technology.  
 The second example shows how Bosch has been able to circumvent the car manufacturers control by 
its exploitation of open standards and moving towards an open vehicular software ecosystem. The 
case is a Wrong way Driver Warning (WDW) service which is possible because of the openness that 
mobile phones introduced into the ecosystem. Interestingly, the core components of the technology – 
including maps and algorithm – are also aken from the public domain.  
WDW warns drivers when they attempt to enter a highway in the opposing direction of traffic.  An 
average of 265 fatal wrong-way crashes occurred annually in the United States, resulting in 355 
fatalities8. Recently, Nissan, Toyota and Mercedes installed warning systems in luxury models.  
Bosch started to develop a cloud-based WDW in 2015. The team includes 15 programmers, data 
scientists, quality, operations and project management experts. They use Scrum as the agile 
development methodology, Java for the backend, NodeJS for the frontend and Python for the 
algorithm. GPS is used to identify location, and Open Street Maps are the reference. The team has 
found that the maps are accurate and are updated often. Identification of wrong-way-driving is done 
with a Monte-Carlo algorithm called ParticleFilter executed ‘on the cloud’.  The system was initiated 
as a pilot in Germany in April 2017, and was downloaded by 40,000 drivers; it ‘travelled’ 90% of the 
31,000 driveways in Germany and identified one true wrong-way drive, and misjudged only 0.004% 
drives as wrong-way. 
At present, value and value capture for Bosch are uncertain and many possibilities are yet to be 
explored. For example, Bosch could charge drivers, but has also considered charging insurance 
companies. Despite these uncertainties, Bosch is pleased with the project as it fits its established 
automotive expertise and its new open data skills.  
 
Finally, the direct way to contest the bottleneck is to become a car manufacturer - a strategy adopted 
by Tesla Motors.  Investments in Tesla from 2004 to 2017 are approaching 12.5 billion dollars. 
Currently, Tesla’s customer experience is good, but mass manufacturing has not been realized yet. 
Specifically, car owners report high satisfaction rates and there are over 500,000 customers who 
ordered Model 3. However, Tesla has manufactured up to now only 250,000 cars and production 
delays continue and its negative free cash has exceeded one billion dollars a quarter11.  So, at present, 
Tesla’s contestation is promising but still not successful.   
Tesla’s contribution to the automotive industry’s software ecosystem is already being felt. Tesla’s 
approach is simultaneously open and closed. Tesla’s over the air update of car software and other 
software-related innovations promote demand for the connected car and pushes the industry towards 
software and connectivity. Similarly, Tesla’s announcement that ‘it will not initiate patent lawsuits 
against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our technology’ (Elon Musk on 12 June 2014) 
promotes openness. On the other hand, Tesla prefers vertical integration in manufacturing12 and its 
software operation is also relatively integrated. It announced that it will not provide a Software 
Development Kit to create third-party apps for its user interface (Elon Musk on 25 January 2015) and 
its software and data are available only to its suppliers. Indeed, Tesla promotes software innovation, 
but in a closed ecosystem.   
Discussion 
Authoritative observers predict a transition of the car industry ‘from hardware- to software-defined 
vehicles’1, which may also open up the software ecosystem in this industry. This short note considers 
the strategies software innovators should take to participate in this transition. Applying ideas about 
industry architecture and strategic bottlenecks3, 4, we expect that car manufacturers will remain 
central5, although new level of openness will emerge as a result of connecting cars to digital 
platforms8.  The three simple strategies we suggest reflect these conclusions, namely innovators can 
cooperate with car manufacturers, circumvent them with the new digital platforms or try to become 
a car manufacturer. 
The current-day illustrations of the three strategies show their viability, but also raise many 
questions.  The strategy to cooperate with a bottleneck owner exemplifies the need for specific deep 
expertise as well as access to millions of cars for several years, in order to create new value. We 
suggest that it is still unclear how services such as predictive maintenance may emerge. Will the car 
manufacturers be ready to share enough of the value with the experts? Will there be others in the 
ecosystem that can create such services? The strategy to circumvent shows that value can be created 
quickly and relatively inexpensively using public domain resources and standards. However, it is still 
unclear how to commercialize such services. Will drivers be ready to pay? If not, who will be ready 
to subsidize the service?  And the strategy of contestation shows with Tesla the investment and risk, 
but also that the disruptor keeps its own software ecosystem closed.  
At a larger scale, the analysis of the automotive industry as it is entering the new era of the 
connected, electric and shared car (not yet autonomous), shows the commercial realities of 
technology. We have seen in the last few years how web and mobile standards can enable monopolies. 
Similarly, the manufacturing scale and customer experience ownership of the car manufacturers will 
continue to be central to cars as mobile computing platforms. Innovators should straddle strategically 
openness and control as they are offered by these companies.  
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